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Chapter 4
New public management as a mechanism 
of accumulation by dispossession: The case of a public 
bulk water provider in South Africa
Carina van Rooyen
Since the 1980s, mainly due to perceptions of state failures, economic 
crises and fiscal deficits, we have seen changes in the role of the state in 
many societies. Both the welfare state and the traditional Weberian model 
of bureaucracy have been the focus of such changes (Batley and Larbi 2004). 
In the initial phase, or first-generation reforms of rolling-back the state 
(Peck and Tickell 2002), the reforms included liberalisation, ‘deregulation’ 
and privatisation, and, in the later phase, since the 1990s, it involved state 
re-regulation (Brenner and Theodore 2007; Peck and Tickell 2002) through 
the introduction of measures such as private-sector management approaches, 
cost-recovery, efficiency and public–private partnerships (PPPs) (Batley and 
Larbi 2004). Nickson (2006: 82) has described these second-generation state 
reforms as focused on the four E’s: effectiveness, economic efficiency, equity, 
and an enabling environment for private-sector development. These do not 
involve a diminished role for the state as much as a new role in terms of what 
the state does and how it does it (Batley and Larbi 2004: 2) – what Bakker 
(2003) has called re-regulation.
The increased use of private-sector principles and the actual participation 
of the private-sector in what is ‘public’ have meant that the boundaries 
between private and public-sector domains have become somewhat blurred, 
although distinctions remain (Larbi 2006). Various structural, organisational 
and managerial changes in the public sector – with national and sectoral 
differences – have become ‘necessary’, including the separation of policy 
making and management functions, the corporatisation of public utilities, 
the ring-fencing of so-called non-core activities, the outsourcing of non-
core services, the introduction of an ‘entrepreneurial ethos’, etc. (Batley and 
Larbi 2004). The notion of new public management (NPM) has come to 
capture much of this shift from government to governance, in which – in 
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the language of the post-Washington Consensus – ‘getting institutions right’ 
is obligatory.
In the last few years, however, NPM’s hegemony has weakened somewhat, 
especially in developing countries, through anomalies and paradoxes between 
theory and practice (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2015). Nevertheless, it 
continues, albeit in new, less one-size-fits-all forms. The tinkering, tweaking, 
sedimentation and layering of so-called post-NPM goes by an array of names, 
such as new public governance, joined-up government, network governance or 
strategic government (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2015). However, I concur 
with Lodge and Gill (2011: 141) who refer to ‘the myth of post-NPM’ and 
argue that there is no evidence that post-NPM entails any significant shift away 
from NPM. 
In this chapter, I consider the implementation of NPM within a particular 
public institution in South Africa (Rand Water), to show why moving 
‘beyond NPM’ is necessary. My research question is: how has NPM been 
implemented in Rand Water, and what can we learn from this about the nature 
of ‘publicness’? I show how NPM acts as a mechanism for David Harvey’s 
notion of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, so that through NPM, private-
sector interests penetrate and commodify the state and its services (Bakker 
and Hemson 2000: 10). Consequent changes to the nature of publicness, and 
the tensions created when public services providers act like private-sector 
actors hint at what the key foundations for ‘beyond NPM’ could be. 
I draw on data gathered during nine months of fieldwork conducted in 
2005 and 2006 at Rand Water. In addition to reading various Rand Water 
documents, I conducted in-depth formal interviews with senior managers of 
Rand Water on changes in the organisation since 1994, and had many informal 
discussions with middle-range managers within Rand Water on this topic. I 
also conducted formal interviews with local government officials responsible 
for water services who regularly interacted with Rand Water. Various informal 
discussions took place with other local government officials and councillors at 
monthly Water Services Forums arranged by Rand Water. All these interviews 
and discussions were conducted on condition of anonymity, and I thus use 
pseudonyms when referring to individuals I interviewed. 
In the sections that follow, I first indicate two broad strands of 
NPM and then turn to the case of Rand Water to show how NPM-type 
reforms were implemented. I draw on Harvey’s (2003, 2004) notion of 
‘accumulation by dispossession’ to argue that NPM acts as a mechanism to 
enhance accumulation by dispossession. I conclude the chapter with a look 
at what publicness ‘beyond NPM’ could possibly mean, given the case of 
Rand Water.
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New public management
In the 1980s to early 1990s, NPM came to the fore, especially in the United 
Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia, as an approach to public-sector 
reform (Larbi 1999; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Uneca 2003). It replaced 
‘public administration’, with its hierarchies in a unified bureaucracy, as a form 
of public governance. Pollitt (in Larbi 1999: 12) defined NPM as a vision, 
an ideology or a bundle of managerial approaches and techniques imported 
from the private sector for application in the public sector. NPM approaches 
advocate a variety of structural, organisational and managerial reforms in the 
public sector that mirror critical aspects of private for-profit sector modes. 
The belief is that by cutting costs, efficiency can be enhanced, government’s 
response to public concerns improved, and better quality and cheaper services 
provided (Uneca 2003).
NPM then provides room for actors other than government to provide 
public services. However, when other actors become involved, partnerships 
and relational contracting are expected. These then require the state to 
play an active role in selective deregulation and re-regulation to create a 
‘competitive’ environment for service delivery (Bakker 2003; McDonald and 
Ruiters 2005b). As a result, private interests penetrate right into the heart of 
state bureaucracy (Bakker and Hemson 2000: 10). Much more than a set of 
new techniques, NPM is about values, and specifically the values of market 
economics instead of democratic governance (Stoker in Ewalt 2001: 8).
While generic elements exist, this does not mean that there is convergence in 
how NPM is practised globally. Rather, NPM is implemented in different ways 
in different states and sectors for diverse reasons and with a variety of impacts 
(Haque 2007: 181; Larbi 2006: 26). As Manning (2001: 298) puts it, NPM 
offers ‘a menu of choices, rather than a single option’. For the purposes of this 
chapter, I discuss two broad ‘but not mutually exclusive strands’ of NPM: one 
focuses on horizontal managerial improvement and organisational restructuring, 
and the other on techniques and practices that give prominence to markets and 
competition in vertical restructuring (Batley and Larbi 2004; Larbi 1999). 
Managerial and organisational restructuring 
Managerial restructuring includes: a focus on organisational and 
managerial performance; decentralising the management of public services 
through devolving financial and human resources management; the 
professionalisation of staff and more entrepreneurial styles of performance; 
and the development of new forms of corporate governance (or ‘a board 
of directors’ model) for the public sector (Batley and Larbi 2004: 15, 41, 
46; Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Bangura and Larbi (2006: 8) found 
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decentralised management to be a key trend in NPM reforms in lower-
income countries. They noted that this could take various organisational 
forms including unbundling, downsizing, corporatisation, and the formation 
of arm’s-length executive agencies (see also Larbi 1999: 17–21). Given the 
corporatisation that happened at Rand Water, I briefly discuss this type of 
decentralised management in the public sector. 
Corporatisation is a process of institutional change whereby management 
institutions (that is, rules, norms and customs) change to allow for the 
introduction of commercial principles (such as full cost-recovery and 
competition), commercial methods (such as cost-benefit analysis, ring-fencing 
and performance contracts) and commercial objectives (such as achieving 
short-term financial bottom-lines and profit-making) (Bakker 2007; 
McDonald and Ruiters 2005b). As McDonald and Ruiters (2005a) explain, 
corporatisation is about running a public service like a business, without 
necessarily involving any private-sector actors. To enable corporatisation 
to take place, a re-regulation of public services has to occur through two 
organisational shifts, namely financial ring-fencing and managerial ring-
fencing (McDonald and Ruiters 2006; Smith 2005). 
Financial ring-fencing involves a process of separating all resources 
directly involved in the delivery of a service from all other service functions 
(McDonald and Ruiters 2006: 12). Ultimately it means that a department 
making use of a shared resource within a public entity (such as information 
technology) has to pay the unit providing that resource a full-cost fee for 
access to that resource. The aim of such financial ring-fencing is to clearly 
identify all costs and revenues related to the delivery of a specific service to 
allow managers to identify areas of financial loss/gain (McDonald 2002: 3; 
McDonald and Ruiters 2005b: 18). 
Managerial ring-fencing ensures that these separate business units and 
entities are managed by appointed officials who work at arm’s length from the 
public authority (McDonald and Ruiters 2006: 12). While elected officials still 
set service delivery goals and standards, and monitor and evaluate these, day-
to-day management and long-term planning is left to the management of the 
ring-fenced entity (McDonald 2002: 3; McDonald and Ruiters 2005b: 18). This 
entity has a separate legal status from other public service providers, and its 
corporate structure mimics that of private-sector companies (McDonald 2014: 1). 
Further, corporatisation fundamentally alters the underlying managerial ethos of 
services provision by ensuring that a private-sector ethos is internalised within 
the public sector (Smith 2005: 168). When economic maximisation (meaning 
efficiency) becomes the goal, social and political values such as equity, social 
justice, subsidisation, universal access, integrated and long-term planning, and 
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democracy tend to receive less attention; service delivery becomes increasingly 
technocratic (McDonald and Ruiters 2005a: 3, 2005b: 17). 
Mechanisms for markets and competition 
The second broad strand of NPM, closely related to the first, is the 
introduction of mechanisms for markets and competition in the public 
sector, supposedly to ensure more ‘choice’ and ‘voice’ to users, and to promote 
efficiency and value-for-money in public service delivery (1999: 16, 2006: 30). 
The argument is that replacing the hierarchy of the ‘old’ public administration 
with markets and contractual relationships (Haque 2007: 180) will help to 
minimise so-called dysfunctions (Batley and Larbi 2004: 40). Thus, the goal 
of introducing these mechanisms is to improve efficiency (Uneca 2003: 7), 
and not to improve services or equity per se (Taylor 2002: 115), although the 
belief is that improved efficiency will lead to improved services. 
Markets and quasi-markets can be introduced in various ways. First, 
to create markets in the public sector requires a separation of policy from 
operation, meaning ring-fencing, as discussed above. Then market-type 
mechanisms can include: contracting out services and other forms of 
private-sector participation (such as PPPs); the introduction of user charges 
for public services; an increasing focus on ‘the customer’; an emphasis on 
quality; the widespread use of contracts or contract-like relationships; and 
performance-based management and benchmarking (Batley and Larbi 2004: 
44–49; McDonald 2014: 11). 
I now provide some brief background on Rand Water, before illustrating 
how, in the case of this public utility, NPM became a mechanism for 
accumulation by dispossession. 
Background on Rand Water
Rand Water is the oldest public utility, and the first water board (a bulk 
potable water provider), in South Africa, having been formed in May 
1903 when the state took over private concessions to provide water to 
Johannesburg and the Witwatersrand area (Rand Water Board 1978). 
 Today Rand Water is the biggest water board in South Africa, providing 62 per 
cent of all bulk water in the country (Diedricks 2015), and the largest public 
water utility in Africa (Rand Water 2006: 4). Over the years, it has expanded its 
area of supply to 18 000 km², covering an area that produces more than 40 per 
cent of South Africa’s gross domestic product (Rand Water 2016: 187).
Rand Water’s primary function is the abstraction, purification and 
distribution of bulk potable water. For abstraction, Rand Water withdraws 
99 per cent of the raw water it uses from the Vaal Dam (some 70 km away 
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from its headquarters) (Rand Water 2005a: 15). The water is then elevated by 
about 380 metres as it is sent to two purification stations. Once treated, water 
is pumped to four booster stations at a head of about 190 metres above the 
Vaal River, creating high pumping costs. From the booster stations, 90 per 
cent of the water is elevated a further 200 metres to 58 reservoirs through 
a network of 3 500 km of large diameter pipelines (Rand Water 2016: 82). 
A further 13 tertiary pump stations and five tertiary chemical dosing plants 
clean the water before it gravitates to Rand Water’s consumers. 
Rand Water distributes bulk water to three metropolitan municipalities 
( Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni and Tshwane), 24 local municipalities, just 
under 50 mines, and around 330 industries; it also provides potable water 
directly to about 600 households. About 92 per cent of its water sales are to 
municipalities (Rand Water 2016: 82–83). In 2016, the organisation, with 
its 3 500 employees, indirectly served 19 million people (Rand Water 2016: 
187) – this amounts to nearly a quarter of South African’s population. Its 
capacity to supply bulk potable water is 5 300 megalitres per day (Ml/d), of 
which an average of about 4 684 Ml/d is used (Rand Water 2016: 17). In 
terms of quality, the water supplied compares with the best in the world. In 
the 1990s, the World Health Organization rated Rand Water’s water quality 
among the top three in the world (Rand Water 2002), and Rand Water’s 
own quality standard is higher than the South African Bureau of Standards’ 
national standard for drinking water (Rand Water Board December 2004: 
701; Rand Water 2016: 96). 
Rand Water is a public utility and the South African government is its sole 
shareholder. In terms of the Water Services Act of 1997 it is accountable to the 
national Department of Water and Sanitation. Rand Water (1996: 4) defines 
itself as a not-for-profit public utility, run on strict business lines. It has a non-
executive board that is appointed by the Minister of Water and Sanitation 
(Rand Water 2005a: 3). The board delegates day-to-day management of the 
utility to a portfolio integrating committee, since October 2005 comprised 
of the chief executive officer (CEO) and six portfolio heads. This managerial 
structure is aligned with various portfolios, based on process integration and 
key organisational outputs, and is supposed to ensure improved organisational 
performance and facilitate growth in full water services provision (Rand 
Water 2005b: 32–33; 2016: 20–21). 
Rand Water’s latest vision statement, formulated in 2012, is ‘to be a 
provider of sustainable, universally competitive water and sanitation 
solutions for Africa’ (Rand Water 2016: 62). The key strategic objectives 
guiding its activities, budget and business focus are: ‘to achieve operational 
integrity and use best fit technology; achieve growth [in infrastructure, 
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through new areas of supply and through new product streams]; achieve 
a high-performance culture; positively engage stakeholder base; [and] 
maintain financial health and sustainability’ (Rand Water 2016: 63). For 
the purposes of this discussion, it is important to note that the word ‘water 
supply’ (or ‘water’ for that matter), the reason for Rand Water’s existence, 
does not appear once in its strategic objectives.
NPM as accumulation by dispossession: the case of Rand Water
Since apartheid was abolished in 1994, Rand Water’s organisational 
activities have become more complex and diverse, as have its structure and 
staffing. Changes related to policies, structures and activities sped up after 
the appointment of Simo Lushaba as CEO in 2002. Drawing on Batley 
and Larbi (2004: 81), the organisational changes that have taken place can 
be categorised as internal management reforms (related to the increasing 
corporatisation of the core activity of bulk water provision) and externally 
oriented market-type reforms (focusing on activities outside of this core 
role). In the rest of this section I use this categorisation to indicate how 
NPM acted as a mechanism to enhance opportunities for ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’. 
The intensification of corporatisation at Rand Water
Since the 1980s, Rand Water has been transformed from being primarily 
a public engineering organisation providing bulk water (Laburn 1979: 
93) to a state enterprise in which financial sustainability and efficiencies 
have become prominent. In the 1980s and early 1990s, an early process 
of corporatisation took place, under Vincent Bath as the first CEO. 
 The implementation of the Water Services Act of 1997 meant that 
corporatisation deepened between 1997 and 2001 (see Van Rooyen 2012). A 
third phase of corporatisation began in 2002, with the appointment of Simo 
Lushaba, Rand Water’s first black CEO, and first CEO with a managerial 
rather than an engineering background. Lushaba was brought into Rand 
Water to drive business and social transformation within the organisation. 
Under him, the key business drivers were identified as customer focus, high 
product and service quality, business growth through partnerships, effective 
transformation, and creating a high-performance organisation (Rand Water 
2005b: 1). Lushaba was expected to create a customer-driven organisation 
that could take advantage of new business opportunities in South Africa and 
Africa (Dube 2002: 55). 
The key features of the corporatisation of Rand Water are evident in its 
organisational structure, its focus on efficiency, its customer and business 
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orientation, as well as its prices and profits. In this chapter, I focus only on 
efficiency, and pricing and profits. Whilst I show that the economic transformations 
within Rand Water largely followed the model of NPM, I also show how some 
contestations – both within and outside of the utility – have led to its transformation 
from a bureaucratic public body to a business-like publicly owned company that is 
enhancing enclosure of water and dispossession of ‘publicness’.
Efficiency drive
Rand Water’s corporate business plan of 2005 identified efficiency, effectiveness 
and innovation (Rand Water 2005c: 21) as the key business drivers around 
which its activities were planned and conducted. In terms of the water sector, 
efficiency can take several forms: technical efficiency (maximising throughput 
and reuse in water production); economic/operational efficiency (the optimal 
use of resources in the production of water); social efficiency (maximising public 
benefit and welfare); and environmental efficiency (maximising production 
of ecological services) (Bakker 2001: 144; Chesnutt 2005; Spronk 2010: 
161). During the time of my fieldwork at Rand Water, efficiency essentially 
referred to operational efficiencies only. The mechanisms used to achieve such 
efficiencies were to enhance productivity using the accounting logic (Broadbent 
and Laughlin 2002) of performance management and performance contracts 
(with financial rewards for staff ), reducing costs (for example, reducing staff ), 
technology utilisation and benchmarking (see Van Rooyen 2012 for detailed 
discussions of each of these). 
The reactions from a number of senior managers within Rand Water to 
this focus on operational efficiencies are captured for me in a quote from 
one of the senior managers who said: ‘We have forgotten that we are actually 
here to provide water. If you look at our Balanced Performance Management 
Framework, you probably won’t even see anything about producing water.’ 
The idea of attention being diverted away from the core activities of Rand 
Water was expressed by one of the executive managers as: 
My supposition is that when Simo [Lushaba] came into the organisation, 
he embarked on a regime of attempting to get Rand Water competitive in 
a commercial sense...which I think is a bit inclined to divert us from this 
non-profit making organisation sort of notion.
In this context, a useful distinction can be made between efficiency and 
effectiveness. As Therkildsen (2001: 3) argues, ‘increased efficiency (maximising 
outcomes for given inputs) does not always fall in with increased effectiveness 
(the extent to which the objectives of a policy or programme are achieved)’. An 
organisation can thus be inefficient (in terms of low ratio of output to input, 
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meaning high cost), but still be effective in achieving the right objectives. And 
an organisation can be efficient (in terms of high ratio of output to input), but be 
pursuing the wrong objectives, ‘often with more damaging results’, argues Israel 
(1987: 12). One of the executive managers of Rand Water expressed this as: 
I suspect that one of the areas that we haven’t really looked at that require 
a bit of focus would be the notion of over-engineering. Because of the 
situation that we are in, we could be efficient, but we could be efficient in 
building a Rolls Royce to do the job of a Mini.
Added to such over-specification is the over-sizing of capacity (Pearson et al. 
1998: 1). Figure 4.1 shows Rand Water’s installed raw water capacity versus 
actual water use (measured in average annual daily demand) since its formation. 
As shown, since the 1970s the gap between surplus capacity and daily demand 
has been growing steadily. By the mid-2000s only 59 per cent of Rand Water’s 
raw water installed capacity was used, 70 per cent of its treatment capacity, 
66 per cent of its primary pumping capacity and 64 per cent of its booster 
pumping capacity (Rand Water 2006: 17). Rand Water’s infrastructure was 
thus kept well ahead of consumption, leading to large and growing surplus 
capacity in Rand Water’s bulk water supply system. 
Figure 4.1 Rand Water’s installed raw water capacity versus actual water demand
 
Source: Adapted from Els (2006).
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In the context of climate change and the likelihood of increased water 
scarcity in Rand Water’s supply area, priority must be given to reducing 
water usage. Arguably, this will enable Rand Water to serve the public good 
far more than its over-specification and over-sizing of supply capacity. Not 
encouraging a radical reduction in water use in this water-scarce region will 
enhance enclosure of this common even further in the long run, through 
inevitable exorbitant cost of water or water cuts/rationing.
Why would Rand Water have continuously invested in infrastructure 
that led to such over-capacity? Harvey’s (2003, 2004) idea of accumulation 
by dispossession offers one explanation.1 Harvey showed how capitalism 
has dealt with its inherent tendency towards crises of over-accumulation 
and uneven development since the 1970s. The theory of over-accumulation 
of capital through expanded reproduction states that, due to over-
exploitation of labour, surplus capital and commodities are available but 
cannot be bought or used. Unless ways are found to absorb such surpluses, 
system-wide devaluations and destructions of capital and labour will occur 
(Harvey 2004). To avoid the devaluation of surpluses, Harvey (2003) argues 
that late-twentieth-century capitalism makes use of spatio-temporal fixes. 
That is, 
surpluses may be absorbed by (a) temporal displacement through 
investment in long-term capital projects [such as water infrastructure] 
or social expenditures (such as education and research) that defer the 
re-entry of current excess capital values into circulation well into the 
future; (b) spatial displacements through opening up new markets, new 
production capacities and new resources, social and labour possibilities 
elsewhere; or (c) some combination of (a) and (b). (Harvey 2004: 2) 
Harvey (2003, 2004) goes on to show how capital expands by incorporating 
those goods, people and activities that have not hitherto been part of 
capitalism. This can include the commodification of public goods and 
services, and the conversion of common and collective property rights to 
private property rights. Drawing on the work of Rosa Luxemburg, Harvey 
(2003, 2004) calls this ‘accumulation by dispossession’, and describes it as 
the dominant form of capital accumulation in the neo-liberal era.
Harvey’s arguments seem to explain Rand Water’s apparently unrequired 
‘over’-investment in infrastructure. In the case of a public provider, where 
would the surplus capital come from that needs investing before it devalues? 
For this, I turn to pricing and profitmaking in Rand Water.
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Pricing and profits 
Since its formation in 1903, Rand Water has not been subsidised nor received 
money from government for its core operations (Rand Water 2005a: 3). 
Traditionally, its revenue has come from the sale of bulk water, and capital 
raised in financial markets through bonds and loans, none of which have been 
government guaranteed. Throughout its history, Rand Water has operated on 
(at least) a full cost-recovery basis, as well as (they claim) a not-for-profit 
basis as required by its then statutes (Rand Water Board 1978; Rand Water 
2005a: 3). Rand Water’s definition of full cost-recovery is noteworthy though; 
it includes all working costs (including maintenance costs), management 
costs, costs related to the repayment of loans (so far cost-reflective), and an 
appropriation for surplus (Rand Water Board 1978). Thus, built into its bulk 
water tariff is a portion for surplus/profit, which in the 2000s was targeted at 
15 per cent (Rand Water Board June 2003: 580; personal interviews). This is 
what I refer to as ‘cost-reflective plus’ tariff.
A further element of this tariff is that Rand Water receives 886 Ml/d of 
the raw water it withdraws from the Vaal Dam for free from the Department 
of Water and Sanitation. This is due to a longstanding agreement dating back 
to 1938, when Rand Water contributed £1.1 million (of the total cost of £1.7 
million) towards the building of the Vaal Dam (Laburn 1979: 23). Thus, by 
including the cost of this water in its budgets, Rand Water is over-calculating 
its costs and increasing its profits, which counters its claim of cost-reflectivity. 
This ‘over-pricing’ effectively dispossesses citizens by them having to pay 
more for water.
These kind of predatory practices, as well as the efficiency measures 
implemented by Rand Water since the early 2000s, combined with continuous 
growth in water sales and a higher bulk water tariff that has been above 
inflation since 2003, have led Rand Water to experience many years of net 
surpluses since 1994. Figure 4.2 shows the utility’s potable water sales, annual 
revenue and surplus from 1995 to 2015. Over this time, revenue has increased, 
based mainly on increased sales of potable water due to the expansion of 
Rand Water’s supply area and increased water demand from consumers. 
Figure 4.2 also reveals that Rand Water has seen increased surpluses (or 
profits) over the period, and since 2001, surplus growth per year for most of 
the period has consistently been over 30 per cent. As a public entity, Rand 
Water is not supposed to make a profit, so the surplus is justified and used 
as capital for new infrastructure and to pay off debt. The utility refers to such 
surpluses as ‘not profiteering but recovering cost of capital’ (Rand Water 
2004). But as indicated above, such profits are being used to build a Rolls 
Royce, where a Mini would do.
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Figure 4.2 Rand Water’s key business performance, 1995–2015
Source: Rand Water (1996, 2005a, 2006, 2014, 2016).
To sum up, in the case of Rand Water NPM led to the intensification of 
corporatisation, opening up water provision to capital accumulation by the 
state, and ultimately being a tool for accumulation by dispossession. While 
transformations in Rand Water’s core services in the late 1990s and the 2000s 
were extensive, I now describe changes in Rand Water’s ‘other activities’, 
including extending its scope to new services and to new areas, which have 
perhaps been more controversial, especially for water activists. 
Expansion into other activities
The second category of NPM-led organisational reform that Rand Water 
underwent relates to externally oriented market-type reforms that led the utility 
into activities beyond its core role of bulk water provision. Since the mid-1990s 
the organisation has been slowly expanding these activities. The signing into 
law of the Water Services Act in 1997, enabled Rand Water to became involved 
in the full cycle of water services, including bulk and retail water supply, bulk 
and retail sanitation, and resource protection (Rand Water 2005a: 2; 2005c: 1). 
In pursuit of expanding its involvement in all water services, and becoming a 
source-to-tap utility company, Rand Water has both expanded the geographical 
area of its bulk water supply, and begun supplying a range of other services in 
South Africa and in other countries. These ‘other activities’ include corporate 
social investment, capacity building and commercial activities in retail water 
services, as well as bulk and retail sanitation services.
In the 1990s, these other activities mainly involved corporate social 
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responsibility activities that were directed through community-based projects 
in support of the government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme. 
In the 2000s, the focus changed to full cost-recovery and profit-making. 
Alongside this, a shift occurred which entailed a move away from dealing with 
these activities in an ad hoc manner through cost centres, to consolidating them 
via the establishment of a set of ring-fenced subsidiary companies. 
Thus, in 2004, as part of Rand Water’s corporate social investment, the 
Rand Water Foundation was founded as a section 21 company,2 to support 
communities with water-related projects (Rand Water 2005b: 6). In 2005, 
another subsidiary, Rand Water Services (Pty) Ltd, started operating to drive 
commercial engagement in other activities both within South Africa and 
outside of its borders, in the rest of Africa, the Indian Ocean islands and the 
Middle East (Rand Water 2005b: 31). In 2010, due to reasons related to not 
making profits and allegations of corruption (see NoseWeek January 2011), 
the Rand Water Board decided to reintegrate the operations of Rand Water 
Services back into the utility itself. In 2012, a third entity was formed, the 
Rand Water Academy, to enhance skills within Rand Water and the broader 
South African water sector, but especially at local government level (Rand 
Water 2014: 26). 
For the rest of the section, I focus on how Rand Water has used ‘public–
public partnerships’ (PUPs) in carrying out its retail water and sanitation 
activities,3 and show how these are enhancing accumulation by dispossession. 
My engagement with this is a response to the appeal by Boag and McDonald 
(2010: 2) to counter the ‘tendency to uncritically celebrate PUP initiatives’. 
PUPs have been celebrated by some as an alternative to PPPs and privatisation, 
as partnerships between public utilities that can enhance access to services 
and support capacity building, especially for the poor, as well as democratise 
public utilities and publicness (Boag and McDonald 2010: 2; Xhafa 2013: 4). 
While I agree that PUPs can achieve these things, they do not necessarily do 
so, and in fact, they can just as easily enhance the corporatisation of public 
utilities, and in this case, the commodification of water and the enclosure of 
the water commons. Rand Water, seen by some as a ‘leading exponent’ of 
PUPs in the water sector (Kriel et al. 2003), demonstrates this well. 
In their PUPs, Rand Water not only aimed to transfer the business model 
of running water services to local municipalities both within South Africa 
and elsewhere in Africa, but also to make a profit in the process of ‘support’ 
(Rand Water 2005b: 23). In its own words, the aim was to promote a shift 
‘from municipal public to corporatised public’ (Rand Water 2003: 3). For 
example, Rand Water defined one characteristic of PUPs as allowing ‘for full 
cost recovery (including a mark-up) [cost-plus] or in certain instances for a 
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sharing of profit’ (Rand Water 2000: 12, emphasis added). When involved in 
‘capacity building’ through these PUPs, Rand Water also promoted principles 
such as efficiency and competition to help entrench its corporatised model. 
It was especially in its contracts outside of South Africa, signed during the 
2000s via its commercial arm (Rand Water Services), that Rand Water was 
being particularly deceptive when highlighting its nature as a public utility 
and describing these contracts as being in the public interest. Such actions 
led people such as Al-Hassen Adam (2005) to proclaim that, in Africa, Rand 
Water runs in the name of the public, but acts in the interest of the private, 
and uses its ‘public’ ownership as a smokescreen to hide its profit-making 
intentions. For some in Rand Water, the PUPs also aimed to ensure that, 
should any of the public utilities involved in the PUPs be privatised, they 
would have ‘value’ for the private sector. As one manager involved in Rand 
Water’s expansion attempts in Africa said:
It is…generally accepted that in order for a utility to run efficiency, it 
needs to privatise. Rand Water has proven that this is not the case. There 
is a role for private sector but we don’t believe that it lies in improving 
efficiency. Utilities should work on increasing their own efficiencies and 
profitability prior to considering privatisation so as to raise their value to 
investors…There is no reason why a public-sector entity cannot run on 
business principles and be efficient – this is the message we plan to take 
throughout the continent, and we have our own successful track record to 
back up what we say. Rand Water wants to assist utilities get to this point 
so that what is on offer to the private sector has value. 
The language of PUPs was thus appropriated to legitimate enclosure and 
dispossession.
The intensification of corporatisation and expansionary activities within 
Rand Water has not happened without difficulties, however. In fact, these 
activities highlighted contradictions, tensions, resistances and failures, as can 
be expected in what Polanyi (1944) described as a ‘double movement’.4 For 
example, some staff members did not want to manage divisions that were out 
to make a profit, others were not interested in pursuing projects outside of 
South Africa, or in working for a company that was ‘making a profit out of the 
problems of local government’, as one senior manager put it. In response to a 
question about how Rand Water Services fits into Rand Water, another senior 
manager who had been involved in other activities before 2005, responded: 
Well it doesn’t. It doesn’t help us; in fact it has been a distraction. Again, 
it has taken our focus off from what we are supposed to be doing. But 
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why do we need it? Why do we need to earn profits? We were formed a 
hundred years ago now. For 95 years, we supplied water; and the money 
it cost us to supply that water is what we set our tariff at. Now why do we 
need to have ten million extra coming in? I think we have lost the plot. 
Yet another senior manager captured the cynicism felt by several of his peers: 
At the moment, we are heading straight for the iceberg. And if we don’t 
re-plot that course, we are going to hit the iceberg; there’s no doubt in my 
mind. 
How do such failures and resistances lead us beyond NPM to publicness? 
Publicness beyond NPM
The case of Rand Water warns against uncritical support for PUPs as part of 
a ‘beyond NPM’ strategy, and shows that PUPs might actually simply involve 
a refinement of NPM. In this regard, it is useful to consider what publicness 
might mean in a ‘beyond NPM’ context.
For one, we need to unpack what kinds of capacity (types of knowledge 
and skills) PUPs are supposed to build in what areas, and in whose interests. 
Unless capacity building extends the capacity of the public sector to act in 
the interest of the public good, fulfilling both equity and efficiency goals in a 
transparent and democratic manner, it is not public-sector capacity building 
but private-sector promotion. In other words, simply having one public-
sector entity engaged in building the capacity of another public-sector entity, 
is no guarantee of the kind of PUP that progressive-minded people should 
support. The muddied waters surrounding PUPs need to be cleared away and 
the various guises of ‘public’ need to be unveiled (so that it is clear to everyone 
whether the term ‘public’ is being used to cover up the interests of private 
capital, and/or nationalist, gendered, or any other kind of interest). 
A typology of PUPs that identifies various kinds of partners (who are 
non-private sector) that can be involved in a PUP might be helpful here. 
Brennan and colleagues (2004) suggested one that includes public–popular, 
public–community, public–workers, public–cooperatives and public–public. 
The typology provided by Hall, Lethbridge and Lobina (2005: 2) builds on 
this, by adding the objectives of the partnership, such as building capacity, 
improving services, defending against privatisation, building stronger 
community support and accountability. Lobina and Hall (2006: 16, emphasis 
added) advocate PUPs as ‘a peer relationship forged around common values 
and objectives, which excludes profit-seeking ’.
Swyngedouw (2006: 64) warns against the common fault of equating 
KNOWLEDGE FOR JUSTICE86
public ownership with a non-commodified form of service delivery. The case 
of Rand Water demonstrated this well. In fact, Rand Water asserted its public 
entity status – partly due to the contestations it faced both inside and outside 
of its own ranks – to access more easily the many opportunities for money 
making in capacity building, support activities and management contracts. 
That is, in many cases, Rand Water used its ‘publicness’ to promote its 
commercial interests. Such Janus-faced seemingly contradictory behaviours 
are part of the hybrid, schizophrenic nature that tends to beset public 
institutions that implement NPM. ‘Publicness’ then has to be much more 
than public ownership; it has to be about public entities – including non-
state ones – acting in the interests of the public, performing activities for the 
benefit of public good in a transparent and democratic manner. 
What then should initiatives that aim to look ‘beyond NPM’ to enhance 
publicness look like? Some of the efforts at re-municipalisation and re-
nationalisation in the water sector since 2000 are certain to be useful as part 
of this unpacking (McDonald 2015: 1). Other names given to such efforts are 
new public service (Denhardt and Denhardt 2003), public value management 
(Stoker 2006), managing publicness (Bozeman 2007), new civic politics 
(Boyte 2011) and capable government (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2015: 
223). In these initiatives, the focus is on the principles underlying the delivery 
of public services such as water supply. Criteria for practices particular to the 
public domain include service (rather than accumulating profit), equity and 
co-operation (rather than competition) (Ranson and Stewart 1994), as well as 
universal provision, accountability, transparency and democracy. Haque (cited 
in Martin 2003: 3) usefully identified five criteria of publicness: 
 ● The extent of the public sector’s distinction from the private sector (such 
as the public characteristics of openness, equity and representation). 
 ● The scope and composition of service recipients (a higher degree of 
publicness is necessary if there is a greater number and broader scope of 
service recipients). 
 ● The magnitude and intensity of its socio-economic role (with wider 
societal impact a greater degree of publicness is required).
 ● The degree of public accountability.
 ● The level of public trust. 
Similarly, Cumbers (2017: 216–217) suggested five principles to keep in mind 
when constructing public democratic ownership: 
 ● Commitment to a ‘fuzzy’ but still egalitarian notion of the common good. 
 ● The importance of ownership and its use to the benefit of the whole. 
 ● Commitment to dispersed decision-making. 
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 ● The importance of diversity, pluralism and tolerance.
 ● Developing forms of ownership that allow for public discourse and 
collective learning. 
To these McDonald (2014: 5) added that we should anticipate ‘publicness…
being disassembled and reassembled’. 
Conclusion
My starting point in writing this chapter is to acknowledge the crucial role of 
the public provision of water for achieving SDG 6 (clean water and sanitation). 
However, I caution that NPM is not the best tool for public utilities to 
adopt as they attempt to fulfil this goal. Using the case of Rand Water, I 
showed how an engineering-dominated public utility was transformed into 
a corporate public entity dominated by professional managers and for-profit 
approaches, practices and values. Through various NPM-type reforms, such as 
the prioritisation of efficiency over effectiveness, and profit-making through 
pricing as well as other (albeit less successful) activities, Rand Water is 
enclosing the provision of affordable quality water for all in its primary supply 
area. The story of this public utility offers a clear example of NPM and PUPs 
working as mechanisms of ‘accumulation by dispossession’. 
In this process, the ideas, practices and interests of the private sector have 
invaded thinking about the public sector, raising questions about what is 
‘public’. In many of its activities Rand Water appears schizophrenic: is it a 
public utility that acts in the public good or is it a profit-making company? 
Should a public utility be making profit, as Rand Water does? Can a privatised 
public utility act in the interest of the public? Not so, I argue. 
The case of Rand Water is a good example of the role of the state in 
accumulation by dispossession as outlined by Harvey (2004). This is not just 
an economic process in which over-accumulated capital seizes non-market 
entities and assets, but rather a political process in which the state wields its 
power to overcome barriers to continued accumulation (Levien 2012: 940). 
In this process, the expropriation, or ‘enclosure of the commons’, imposes 
new social relations of power. Unease about and resistance to the changes 
occurring in Rand Water as expressed by staff and management during my 
fieldwork highlight the nature of contestations within state organisations 
undergoing NPM, and possibly indicate what might be possible with regard 
to moving ‘beyond NPM’.
Crucially, given that public ownership does not guarantee non-
commodified forms of service delivery, the notion of ‘publicness’ beyond 
NPM must be further explored. How can the principles of equity, inclusivity, 
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collaborative dialogue, efficiency, affordability, quality, social justice, 
solidarity, sustainability, democracy, citizenship and public accountability be 
practised? And what is the role of non-state public role players in constructing 
such ‘publicness’? 
Notes
1   In a context of growing demand, it is, of course, prudent to have spare capacity; 
Ramsey and Mobbs (2001:29) indicate recommended ‘headroom’ of 5–10 per cent. 
But numerous respondents within Rand Water implied that the surplus capacity 
was continuously and rapidly expanded in ways that they saw as questionable and 
unnecessary. 
2   In terms of South Africa’s Companies Act, Section 21 companies provide services 
with the intention not to make a profit.
3   For a detailed description of Rand Water’s other activities, see Van Rooyen and 
Hall (2007), and Van Rooyen (2012).
4   Karl Polanyi (1944) predicted that efforts to extend the market economy would 
be countered by society. 
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